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Abstract
Some studies suggest that ﬁshery yields can be higher with reserves than under
conventional management. However, the economic performance of ﬁsheries depends on
economic proﬁt, not ﬁsh yield. The predictions of higher yields with reserves rely on
intensive ﬁshing pressures between reserves; the exorbitant costs of harvesting low-
density populations erode proﬁts. We incorporated this effect into a bioeconomic model
to evaluate the economic performance of reserve-based management. Our results
indicate that reserves can still beneﬁt ﬁsheries, even those targeting species that are
expensive to harvest. However, in contrast to studies focused on yield, only a moderate
proportion of the coast in reserves (with moderate harvest pressures outside reserves) is
required to maximize proﬁt. Furthermore, reserve area and harvest intensity can be
traded off with little impact on proﬁts, allowing for management ﬂexibility while still
providing higher proﬁt than attainable under conventional management.
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INTRODUCTION
Ecologists have dedicated considerable effort towards iden-
tifying management strategies that maximize ﬁshery yields.
These studies often conclude that no-take marine reserves,
initially developed as a conservation tool, may also beneﬁt
some ﬁsheries (Gerber et al. 2003 and references therein).
Accumulation and maintenance of mature ﬁsh stocks to
carrying capacity levels within reserves may enable them to
serveassourcestoadjacentﬁshingareasthroughspill-overof
adults and export of larvae across reserve boundaries
(Crowder et al. 2000; Kellner et al. 2007). Such beneﬁts of
reserves to ﬁsheries may outweigh costs of prohibiting
ﬁsheriesfromdirectlyutilizingtheprotectedareas,producing
higher yields than those sustainable under conventional,
quota-based management (Halpern & Warner 2003).
Polacheck (1990) predicted spawning stock biomass to
increase within reserves, but for this to rarely lead to optimal
levels of spill-over that increase ﬁshery yield. Elegant
analytical analyses by Hastings & Botsford (1999) demon-
strated that exploitation by ﬁsheries of larval export from
reserves can generate equivalent yields compared with those
under conventional management; this result was elaborated
upon by others who found reserves to increase yield,
especially for species with intercohort post-dispersal density
dependence (Neubert 2003; Gaylord et al. 2005; White &
Kendall 2007). For these species, harvesting of adult
populations between reserves reduced their competitive
and predatory effects on younger conspeciﬁc individuals,
thereby increasing the recruitment rate of larvae exported
from reserves into ﬁshed areas. Intercohort post-dispersal
density dependence is common among nearshore ﬁsh
(Hixon & Webster 2002), especially among predatory
species (Hallacher & Roberts 1985; Hobson et al. 2001),
who also happen to be priority target species for many
ﬁsheries (CDFG 2004).
In the above studies, all proposed strategies that increase
ﬁshery yield by creating reserves rely on ﬁshing pressures in
unprotected areas that are more intense than the optimal
ﬁshing pressure under conventional management. However,
from the perspective of ﬁsheries, net economic proﬁt, not
gross yield, is the appropriate metric for measuring the
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management policies, which often fail when lacking the
endorsement of and cooperation from local ﬁsheries
(Crutchﬁeld 1973; Kaplan 1998; Davis 2005). Furthermore,
because the cost to catch a ﬁsh increases as the density of a
ﬁsh population declines (the stock effect, Clark 1990), a
strategy that relies on more intensive ﬁshing pressures may
compromise proﬁts: increased yields with reserves may not
generate higher proﬁts, and reserve management that only
equals yields attainable under conventional management will
reduce proﬁts.
Using a generalized bioeconomic model affected by
environmental stochasticity, Armsworth & Roughgarden
(2003) demonstrated that a system may increase its
economic value when it incorporates reserves that promote
ecological stability. Stefansson & Rosenberg (2005, 2006)
constructed discrete-time bulk biomass models with nested
economic ﬂeet models that incorporated stochasticity in
the form of management uncertainty; they too found
reserves to buffer negative economic effects introduced by
stochasticity. These studies support the notion that
reserve-based management represents a precautionary
approach that may increase the overall stability of ﬁsh
populations and ﬁshery yields, thus the economic value of
the ﬁshery, in the face of environmental variability and
uncertainty in knowledge of ecological conditions critical
to effective management (Lauck et al. 1998; Carr &
Raimondi 1999).
In one of the few papers to explicitly consider the stock
effect under a broad range of ﬁsh population and ﬁshery
harvest conditions, Sanchirico et al. (2006) analysed a
bioeconomic model with spatial heterogeneity in economic
and ecological parameters, and identiﬁed conditions when
reserve-based management maximized long-term proﬁt to
ﬁsheries. Their model is deterministic, and includes
interpatch larval dispersal and density-dependent recruit-
ment. Among other less intuitive conditions, Sanchirico
et al. determined a patch to be a likely candidate for
closure if it was characterized by low biological produc-
tivity, high harvest cost and net exportation of biomass.
Under no conditions did they find reserve-based manage-
ment to be optimal when habitat quality was homo-
geneous and interpatch dispersal was symmetrical.
However, their model had interpatch dispersal between
only two patches of equal size, thus the only reserve
strategy possible was exactly 50% closure of the coastline,
and the fish density outside the reserve is spatially uniform
(there is no possibility for increased densities at the
boundaries of reserves).
Here, we analyse a model that is similar in biological and
economic assumptions to Sanchirico et al., but introduce
space as a continuous, linear coastline and assume that
dispersal is localized. We ask if reserve-based management
strategies predicted to increase fishery yield can also increase
fishery profit, despite their reliance on increased harvest
pressures compared with conventional management. Our
results are a striking contrast to the conclusions of
Sanchirico et al.
METHODS
We focused our analysis on nearshore ﬁsh and invertebrate
species characterized by a sessile adult stage subject to
density-independent mortality, and a pelagic larval stage that
disperses. We developed an integrodifference model with
these simple elements of life history:
Atþ1
x ¼ At
x   Ht
x   MA t
x   Ht
x
  
þ PRt
x
Z 1
 1
At
x0   Ht
x0
  
K t
x x0 dx0;
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where t, x and x¢ refer to time and two locations along a
uniform coastline, respectively, A=number of adult fish
(units arbitrary), H=harvest, M=natural annual adult
mortality rate, P=adult per capita production of larvae that
survive to settlement, Kx ) x¢ = the proportion of larva
settling at location x that originated from location x¢ and
R=recruitment probability of settling larvae. The larval
dispersal kernel represented by Kx ) x¢ is Gaussian, based on
simulations of ocean mixing processes, and adjustable via a
chosen mean larval dispersal distance Dd (Siegel et al. 2003;
and calculations therein). The model is discretised into
1-year time steps and 1-km length segments along the coast,
and ﬁsh mature at 1 year. Harvesting occurs after dispersal
but before the next bout of reproduction. Thus, ﬁshing
mortality begins when ﬁsh are c. 1 year old. This model is
identical to the single-size-class model presented by Gaylord
et al. (2005, p. 2181; eqn 1), with the following differences:
the coastline is not limited in length, inclusion of H allows
for non-zero fishery escapement levels, and we focused
solely on intercohort post-dispersal density dependence.
Recruitment success of larvae decreases exponentially with
increasing adult abundance at the settlement location:
Rt
x ¼ e gðAt
x Ht
xÞ; ð2Þ
where g characterizes the severity of the density-dependent
recruitment process. Equation 1 represents a single adult
stage class preceded by a single pre-recruit stage class. This
conservative approach reduces unnecessary complexity
(White & Kendall 2007), as well as enables eqn 2 to capture
density-dependent recruitment processes occurring shortly
after settlement (e.g. via depredation, Hobson et al. 2001),
during the juvenile⁄subadult stage (e.g. via competition
and⁄or territoriality, Larson 1980; Love et al. 1991) or both.
We limited ﬁsh and invertebrate movement to their larval
stage during dispersal. Although spill-over caused by adult
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(Kellner et al. 2007), we assumed along-shore site ﬁdelity,
because it is common in many nearshore ﬁsh and
invertebrates (e.g. Topping et al. 2005).
Proﬁt to a ﬁshery is a function of revenue gained from
selling ﬁsh yield, minus the cost of catching those ﬁsh. We
modelled the marginal cost of ﬁshing to be inversely
proportional to local ﬁsh density, h⁄(fish*km
)1) (Clark
1990), where higher values of h represent species that are
intrinsically more expensive to harvest. For each 1-km
distance bin along the coast, the annual cost of harvesting
was calculated by integrating along the stock effect curve
from the pre-harvest to post-harvest population density
(Fig. 1a). We then subtracted local cost from local revenue,
based on a ﬁxed market price of $1 per ﬁsh, and averaged
across the entire coastline to estimate mean proﬁt ($*km
)1).
To highlight the difference between reserve based, and
conventional ﬁsheries management, we examined sustain-
able proﬁt, and thus implicitly assumed zero discounting.
Let the virgin carrying capacity be 100 fish*km
)1 and A
be the fish density below which marginal cost would exceed
marginal revenue; because price = 1, A=h. This zero
marginal profit point represents a (marginal revenue)⁄(mar-
ginal cost) rate equal to 1, and is the density below which no
fisherman, no matter how myopic, would harvest. As a
result, h is the percentage of virgin density below which
fishing would naturally cease.
When left without escapement restrictions, modern
ﬁsheries worldwide have demonstrated their ability to
exploit ﬁsh populations to remarkably low escapement
levels (i.e. < 20% of original stock), and maintain over many
years sufﬁcient harvest pressures for preventing recovery of
stocks from those low levels (Lipcius & Stockhausen 2002;
Cardinale & Svedang 2004; Worm et al. 2006). h = 0
represents a fishery being able to harvest with perfect
efficiency. We evaluated fishery management across this
range of conditions (0 £ h £ 20, Fig. 1b).
To eliminate confounding effects caused by common
pool management (where proﬁts may be dissipated from the
race to ﬁsh, Gordon 1954), we approached the problem
from the perspective of several independent ﬁsheries each
having exclusive access to a particular species represented
by a stock effect value. Species-speciﬁc regulatory rules
of escapement and harvest distribution were implicitly
enforced on each ﬁshery by an outside agency or internally
(e.g. by a ﬁshing cooperative).
Model scenarios represented the full factorial of adult
productivity, adult annual natural mortality, mean larval
dispersal distance and stock effect parameter values in
Table 1. Equilibrium adult density (i.e. carrying capacity)
was scaled to 100 ﬁsh*km
)1 in the absence of ﬁshing
mortality [i.e. given set demographic values, the density
dependence coefﬁcient was solved: g=100
)1 log(P*M
)1)].
In each model scenario, we considered all of the 18
reserve policies listed in Table 1, including that having no
reserves (i.e. conventional management). A reserve was
deﬁned as an area permanently closed to ﬁshing. For each
reserve policy, we considered a range of systematically
varied reserve size and spacing conﬁgurations, from that
represented by many small, closely-positioned reserves to
fewer, larger reserves positioned farther apart. To maintain
evenness in reserve size and spacing for each conﬁguration,
we simulated model space along a circular domain;
perimeter length of the domain was adjusted (up to
1500 km) to allow for different conﬁgurations. The spatial
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Figure 1 Stock effect curve(s) estimating marginal cost relative to
local ﬁsh population density. (a) Schematic representation of the
calculation of ﬁshery proﬁt at one location during a single harvest
season, as a function of revenue based on a ﬁxed market price ($1)
per ﬁsh unit, minus the sum of the marginal costs of harvesting
down the local ﬁsh population. In this example the ﬁshery
harvested to the zero marginal proﬁt level, where (marginal
revenue)⁄(marginal cost) = 1. (b) Stock effect curves representing
ﬁshery species that are of different marginal costs to harvest.
Increasing values of h represent fishery species that are intrinsically
more expensive to harvest.
372 C. White et al. Letter
  2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/CNRSbreadth of our approach enabled us to capture the variable
ﬁsh population and ﬁshery dynamics resulting from
different single large vs. several small (SLOSS) reserve
conﬁgurations. However, resolving the SLOSS debate was
not the goal of this study, rather, we optimized conﬁgura-
tion to optimize reserve-based management for comparison
with optimal conventional management. The homogeneous
conditions of our model system were ideal for this exercise
because it enabled us to explore all symmetrical reserve
conﬁgurations possible within an exceptionally large coastal
domain.
Given initial design variable values, and a reserve policy
and conﬁguration, we imposed each of the 89 escapement
policies in Table 1 across the entire ﬁshable domain (i.e.
area between reserves). This broad range of harvest levels
collectively saddles the zero marginal proﬁt point for each
value of h, generating all reasonable (marginal reve-
nue)⁄(marginal cost) rates, whether optimal or not.
We compared equilibrium yields (h = 0) and profits
(h > 0) of optimal as well as sub-optimal reserve-based
management strategies with those attainable under optimal
conventional management. Optimal management was defi-
ned as the strategy characterized by reserve policy,
configuration and escapement that maximized sustainable
profit. Optimal conventional management was limited to
strategies without reserves. Sub-optimal management was
defined as a strategy whose maximum sustainable profit
was marginally less than that achievable under optimal
management.
Without reserves, all ﬁsh population and ﬁshery dynamics
in our model are spatially homogeneous; in this case
identical solutions can be achieved via a constant escape-
ment or constant effort policy (where a constant fraction of
the population in each patch is harvested). With reserves,
interactions among the spatially explicit protection of ﬁsh
stocks, larval dispersal kernel and density dependence
recruitment function generate variable ﬁsh population
densities along the domain, potentially generating differ-
ences in proﬁt attainable via policies focused on escapement
vs. effort. In this study, we focused on escapement because
(i) it directly related to h, enabling us to most clearly
illuminate how harvest pressure effects fishery profit and
because (ii) regulation of escapement has in general been
demonstrated to be optimal in maximizing profit from a
renewable resource whose dynamics are described by either
deterministic or stochastic stock-recruitment models (Reed
1979; Costello et al. 2001). However, there is not a
consensus on the latter issue (e.g. among Walters & Parma
1996 and authors of the previous citations), and regulation
of effort may better reﬂect practiced ﬁshery management
policies. For these reasons, we re-ran our model with
harvest regulated via constant effort to determine if
consideration of this policy recovered qualitatively similar
results compared with those generated by the constant
escapement policy.
RESULTS
Given a ﬁxed fraction of the coastline in reserves, ﬁshery
yields (h = 0) and profits (h > 0) were maximized via
similar reserve network configurations (Fig. S1, in Supple-
mentary Material). With small or moderate proportions (e.g.
< 20%) of the coast in reserves, yields and proﬁts were
similar across the full breadth of evaluated conﬁgurations.
With larger proportions in reserves, yields and proﬁts were
maximized by small- or medium-sized reserves with short or
moderate inter-reserve distances. We found a consistent
pattern with respect to dispersal distance of the targeted
ﬁshery species: for a speciﬁed proportion of the coast in
reserves, maximum or near-maximum yields and proﬁts
Table 1 Symbol, value(s) and description of
design parameters (A, M, P, g, Dd, h and p)
and variables (escapement and proportion
coast in reserves). Fish units are numerical
and arbitrary. A full factorial of all values
was simulated. Marginal cost equals marginal
revenue when (Aeq[H = 0])(escapement) =
h%. See Siegel et al. (2003) for calculations
using Dd.
Parameter⁄variable Values evaluated Description
Aeq[H = 0] 100 Equilibrium virgin population density
(ﬁsh per km), where H=harvest
M 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 Natural annual mortality probability
P 1, 2, 3 Adult per capita production of larvae
that survive to settlement
g =Log(P*M
)1)⁄
(Aeq[H = 0])
Density-dependent recruitment
coefﬁcient
Dd 10, 100, 200 Mean larval dispersal distance
(km) for calculating Kx ) x¢
h 0, 5, 10, 15, 20 Stock effect coefﬁcient ($ * km
)1)
p 1 Price ($ per ﬁsh) = marginal revenue
(Ax ) Hx)⁄
(Aeq[H = 0])
0.01, 0.02, 0.03… 0.9 Escapement
Frac(x[Hx = 0]) 0, 0.05, 0.1,… 0.9 Proportion coast in reserves
288 360 Total number of scenarios simulated
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equal to or less than the mean larval dispersal distance.
Given our baseline life history parameters, yield under
conventional management was maximized by setting escape-
ment to 34% of virgin carrying capacity (Fig. 2a, horizontal
dashed line). Maximum yields with reserves were substan-
tially greater, but required high harvest pressure (escape-
ment < 30%) between optimally conﬁgured reserves that
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Figure 2 Yield and proﬁt in relation to the stock effect, proportion of the coast in reserves and escapement in ﬁshed areas. (a–e) Yields and
proﬁts under different stock effect scenarios, given optimal conﬁguration of reserves compromising a proportion of the coast (% Reserves,
where zero represents conventional management). Curved lines represent different escapement levels regulated across the ﬁshed region. For
reference, the horizontal dashed lines indicate maximum yield and proﬁts attainable under optimal conventional management. M=0.1,
P=1, results are quantitatively identical across all evaluated mean larval dispersal distances. (f) Optimal per cent reserve and escapement
policies that maximize yield (h = 0, squares) and profit (h > 0, circles), for all combinations of M, P and h values in Table 1. In general,
optimal management was characterized by decreased per cent reserves concurrent with increased escapement as h increased (arrow). Symbol
size corresponds with policy frequency. Conventional management (upper left points) was optimal when P=1 and h = 20 [e.g. panel (e)], in
all of those cases, sub-optimal management with up to 35% reserves only decreased profits by < 5%.
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curved lines). The overall maximum yield emerged when
reservesconstituted60%ofthecoastandescapementoutside
them was zero. The only effect of dispersal distance was to
changetheoptimalconﬁgurationateachreserveproportion.
The stock effect (h > 0) reduced fishery profits under all
management strategies, whether conventional or with
reserves (Fig. 2b–e). Nevertheless, maximum ﬁshery proﬁts
under optimal reserve-based management were at least
approximately equal, and typically substantially greater than,
those attainable under optimal conventional management,
regardless of adult natural mortality (M) or per capita
production (P) values (Fig. 3). We re-simulated all ﬁsh
population and ﬁshery management conditions under an
effort-based regulatory policy, and found the relative
increase in proﬁts with reserves at least to equal those
recovered by the escapement-based policy.
Escapement levels required to maximize proﬁts increased
with increased stock effect severity. With reserves, the
optimal proportion of the coast protected from ﬁshing also
shifted (from high to low) with increasing stock effect
severity (Fig. 2f). Optimal management required a particular
combination of per cent reserve and escapement for each
stock effect scenario. However, the stock effect actually
ﬂattens the relationship between proﬁt and reserve area.
There is a broad spectrum of similarly proﬁtable near-
optimal management strategies characterized on its extreme
ends by (i) low revenue combined with low cost of ﬁshing
lightly along most of the coast and (ii) high revenue
combined with high cost of ﬁshing intensively between
reserves that constituted a substantial proportion of the
coast (for all strategies within this spectrum, proﬁts
exceeded maximum proﬁt under conventional manage-
ment). This spectrum allows us to design a single policy
(reserve network plus escapement levels) that achieves near-
optimal proﬁt simultaneously across all values of h.
As an example, management characterized by 20%
reserves and optimal escapement for each h generated
equal or increased profits compared with optimal conven-
tional management (Fig. 4a, along the surface ridge).
Optimal escapement under this scenario varied minimally
with stock effect severity (i.e. the ridge is broad and
approximately orthogonal to the escapement axis). As a
result, equal or increased proﬁts compared with conven-
tional management are obtainable across all ﬁshery species,
given regulation of single escapement level at c. 35%. This
pattern was consistent across nearly all productivity and
mortality values (Fig. S2a).
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Figure 4 Relative difference in proﬁt between sub-optimal
reserve-based management (Reserve) and optimal management
without reserves (Conventional). Sub-optimal reserve-based man-
agement is characterized by 20% (a) and 60% (b) of the coast
dedicated to an optimally conﬁgured reserve network. Policies are
evaluated across all stock effect scenarios, and regulation of
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escapement was set optimally to 34–47% for h = 0–20, respec-
tively. Curved surfaces represent model results, dark horizontal
planes are inserted for reference, representing equivalence in profit
between the two management strategies. Vertical plane is inserted
in (b) for reference, representing h% escapement. M=0.1, P=1.
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tion beneﬁt, is characterized by 60% reserves and optimal
escapement. This policy would at best substantially increase
proﬁts, and at least marginally decrease proﬁts, when
compared with optimal conventional management (Fig. 4b,
along the surface ridge). Here, proﬁt was more sensitive to
changes in escapement than in the 20%–reserve policy
presented above, and optimal escapement increased con-
siderably with increased h (i.e. compared with that in
Fig. 4a, the ridge is narrower and runs at an angle with
respect to the escapement axis). As a result, no single
escapement level could consistently generate satisfactory
proﬁts across all stock effect conditions compared with
proﬁts attainable under conventional management. How-
ever, optimal escapement was similar to h%, the zero
marginal profit-escapement level (see description of h in
Methods). As a result, h% escapement intersects nearly
along the ridge of the profit-escapement-stock effect surface
in Fig. 4b (vertical plane). Mean proﬁt across stock effect
scenarios was greater under this sub-optimal policy (60%
reserves, h% escapement) than under optimal conventional
management, a trend that was substantially increased for
nearly all fishery species (Fig. S2b).
DISCUSSION
Our bioeconomic model captures the fact that overly
intensive harvesting is detrimental to ﬁshery proﬁt. As a
result, and in contrast to studies focused on yield, offsetting a
large proportion of the coast in reserves while allowing c. 0%
escapement outside the reserves will not maximize profit.
However, when properly accounting for the stock effect,
reserves still emerged as a viable management tool under
both escapement and effort-based regulation programmes.
Optimal, and even moderately sub-optimal, reserve-based
policies generated profits approximately equal to or greater
than those attainable under optimal conventional manage-
ment. The breadth of reserve-based management strategies
that improve on conventional management offers the
opportunity to identify solutions that can simultaneously
satisfy consumptive and conservation values.
Sanchirico et al. (2006) also integrated the stock effect
into a bioeconomic model to investigate the economic value
of reserves; however, unlike that determined here, they
found reserves not to be optimal when all patches are
homogeneous in ecological and economic conditions. Our
study reveals a previously unidentiﬁed value from reserves
because we explicitly considered a coastal domain consisting
of numerous patches connected by local dispersal dynamics;
our approach enabled us to optimize reserve conﬁguration,
then quantify ensuing patch-speciﬁc population dynamics,
associated with different per cent reserve policies. As a
result, we identiﬁed optimal reserve policies (e.g. 35%
reserves, given h = 15, Fig. 2d) that were not even
considered in Sanchirico et al.s two-patch model.
Compared with that presented here, consideration of a
patch-speciﬁc harvest policy within ﬁshed areas may further
increase proﬁts by enabling ﬁsheries to generate and exploit
source-sink dynamics via spatially heterogeneous harvest
pressures. Recent theoretical work by Ralston & OFarrell
(in press) indicates that yield of a species with the same form
of density dependence as that studied here may be
maximized when spatial heterogeneity in harvest is increased
to the extreme case characterized by closure of a patch.
Spatial heterogeneity in harvest can also lead to reserves
when patches are intrinsically heterogeneous in habitat
quality, interpatch dispersal rates and⁄or cost of harvest
(Sanchirico et al. 2006). However, in a bioeconomic analysis
based on the California sea urchin ﬁshery, Smith & Wilen
(2003) demonstrate that overly simplistic consideration of
economic incentives (e.g. proximity to port) that drive
spatial heterogeneity in harvest rates by ﬁsheries can bias
results in favour of reserves.
Fishery management is fraught with uncertainty, e.g.
measurement error surrounding stock assessment and
regulation error surrounding enforcement of catch levels.
Our model is unrealistic in assuming that the state of nature
(ﬁsh abundances and parameter values) is known precisely,
thus the manager is able to choose and enforce regulations
exactly. However, inclusion of uncertainty in our study may
not alter its qualitative conclusions in support of reserves,
because consideration of uncertainty has almost always
contributed substantially to the long-term sustainability
advantage of reserve-based management over conventional
management (see references in Introduction). Forthcoming
work by Costello and Polasky (in review), provides explicit
evidence in support of this concept that optimal manage-
ment of a stochastic dynamic resource includes use of
reserves.
The results presented here assume that the bioeconomic
system is at equilibrium; in particular, ﬁsh populations within
reserves are near virgin carrying capacity and therefore
generating high larval export rates to ﬁshed areas (Halpern &
Warner 2003). Under some conditions, high population
densities may develop quickly in response to protection from
ﬁshing(Halpern&Warner2002;butseeRuss&Alcala2004),
but the short-term effects of reserves on ﬁshable biomass
levels in adjacent areas is only beginning to be revealed
empirically(Lester&Halpern2007).Itisquitepossiblethatif
a ﬁshery is currently well managed, there may be a short-term
drop in proﬁts after optimal reserves are established.
Optimal reserve conﬁguration was characterized by
reserve width being equal to or less than the mean larval
dispersal distance of the targeted ﬁshery species – a result
that is supported by studies focused solely on yield (Gaylord
et al. 2005). The same reserve design maximized both yield
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neously maximized yield (and thus revenue) and minimized
cost of ﬁshing. Overly large reserves were undesirable
because larval export was reduced. Small reserves persisted
due to inter-reserve larval recruitment; however, inordi-
nately small reserves may not be appropriate when one
considers adult movement (Halpern & Warner 2003). The
symmetry of the optimal conﬁgurations presented here, due
to our simpliﬁed characterization of a linear, homogeneous
coast and symmetrical dispersal kernel, should not be
interpreted as literal guidance for ﬁsheries management.
To the contrary, evenness in reserve conﬁguration is likely
not optimal in a spatially heterogeneous system (Kaplan
2006).
Despite long-held interest in identifying optimal manage-
ment strategies that maximize yield, ﬁsheries worldwide
have rarely approached optimal yields. It is challenging and
costly to enforce ﬁshery regulations (e.g. quotas, Akiba
1997), and the data (e.g. ﬁsh stock size) required for
calculating optimal regulations are often exceedingly expen-
sive to obtain (Uozumi 2003). Given these constraints, we
asked if there were sub-optimal management strategies that
beneﬁt ﬁsheries sufﬁciently well compared with optimal
management, while reducing costs and challenges associated
with formulating and enforcing the management strategy.
We explored two sub-optimal reserve-based strategies, both
of which equalled or increased proﬁt compared with
conventional management, and may be more practical to
implement and regulate, as well as agreeable from a non-
economic perspective to ﬁshery and conservation parties: (i)
dedication of a moderate proportion (20%) of the coast to
reserves concurrent with a ﬂat escapement policy (c. 35%)
across all species harvested and (ii) dedication of a
substantial proportion (60%) of the coast to reserves with
escapement outside set at the point of zero marginal profit.
Optimal management without reserves required regula-
tion of escapement at 34–47% for h = 0–20, respectively.
Regulation of escapement is widespread, yet it can be
challenging and expensive to enforce (Sutinen & Andersen
1985), an issue that may be exacerbated when multiple
escapement levels are enforced simultaneously in a region.
The ﬁrst sub-optimal management strategy (Figs 4a and
S2a) could ameliorate this issue by allowing managers to
focus on a single escapement policy (c. 35%) across multiple
species. A fishery targeting species that are intrinsically
expensive to harvest (h = 20) would equal profits compared
with those under conventional management, while ones
targeting less expensive species would accrue increased
profits. As a result, this management strategy, representing a
commitment to reserves that is already being approached in
some regions (e.g. in California, CDFG 2007), may
represent a viable option for simultaneously beneﬁting
ﬁshery and regulatory parties.
The above management policy still requires substantial
effort and expense to assess stocks for calculating harvest
levels, as well as enforcement of those harvest levels across
each ﬁshery. From a ﬁshery perspective, enforcement of
spatial closures represents adding yet another layer of
regulation. The second sub-optimal management policy we
evaluated – 60% of the coast in reserves, concurrent with
h% escapement across all fisheries (Figs 4b and S2b) – may
circumvent this issue by redirecting management focus solely
towards spatial closures. Under this policy a ﬁshery is no
longer told by regulators when it has reached its quota and
must cease harvesting, a fresh change in ﬁshery management
that may be appreciated (Salas & Gaertner 2004). Instead, a
ﬁshing vessel may approach a h% escapement level based on
current harvest costs experienced onboard while at sea. This
policy also reduces the burden of stock assessments that
challenge the ability to calculate quotas. Instead, managers
may focus on monitoring fishing vessel location, a task
already accomplished remotely and efficiently with Global
Positioning System technology (Randall 2004). Thus, in
addition to the explicitly evaluated economic gains generated
by this policy, the implicit costs of regulation and social
conﬂict between the ﬁshery and managers may be markedly
reduced. However, a caveat accompanies this policy, which
allows for low escapement compared with other policies we
explored. High harvest pressures associated with low
escapement may reduce recruitment rates in ﬁshed areas
through habitat degradation (e.g. via trawling), thereby
reducing the economic value of this policy.
Individual ﬁshing vessels sometimes target multiple
ﬁshery species simultaneously, a strategy they may assert to
maintain high overall catch levels amidst ﬂuctuations in
abundance of individual species (Vestergaard et al. 2003;
Perez-Espana et al. 2006), or as a part of a more deterministic
shift in ﬁshing effort away from species that are less
abundant (e.g. due to overﬁshing) and towards other species
that are more abundant (Milessi et al. 2005). Our model does
not explicitly consider multispecies ﬁsheries; however, with
some broad assumptions we can estimate qualitative effects
of conventional vs. reserve-based management on such a
ﬁsherys proﬁt. Given exclusive access to two species (e.g.
those represented by h = 10 and 20), and its ability to
employ a single harvest method for catching those species, a
fishery is predicted to experience reduced cost per fish
harvested for the more costly-to-harvest species as long as it
is catching it alongside the less expensive species. In essence,
the h = 20 species would serve as by-catch that supplements
harvest of the equal or more abundant h = 10 species, which
sets the cost per harvest rate for both species. Given at least
equal price of the h = 20 relative to the h = 10 species, the
reduction in cost per h = 20 fish harvested would increase
current-year profit gained from that species, thereby bene-
fiting the fishery under either conventional or reserve-based
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continue harvesting the h = 20 species below its indepen-
dent 20% zero marginal profit-escapement level, to a 10%
zero marginal profit-escapement level set by the h = 10
species, thereby further increasing profit. However, this
second benefit would only be realized if sustainable
management allowed for such a low escapement level.
Although not guaranteed, such anoption is more likely under
reserve-based management, which in general allowed for
higher fishing pressures in fished areas compared with those
under conventional management (see Fig. 2f). The lowest
escapement levels observed in our analyses occurred when
reserves constituted a large proportion of the coast,
suggesting that such a policy may be amenable to a
multispecies ﬁshery able to reduce the effective h of
secondary species that it targets.
Although our model did not explicitly evaluate effects of
demographic and environmental stochasticity on ﬁsheries
management, the economic efﬁcacy of reserves is not
predicted to decrease with consideration of such stochastic
processes (see Introduction). Nonetheless, there remains a
paucity of studies exploring effects of stochastic processes
on ﬁshery yields and proﬁts (Gerber et al. 2003), highlight-
ing the need for future attention to this topic. We assumed
several population dynamic and life history features (e.g.
absence of adult growth and the form of density depen-
dence) that could be important for our results. Consider-
ation of the former via a age-⁄stage-structured model is
predicted to further increase yields with reserves, because
older⁄larger ﬁsh, which are preferentially protected in
reserves, produce exponentially more offspring, resulting
in greater larval export to ﬁshed areas (Gaylord et al. 2005).
Consideration of alternative forms of density dependence
may substantially alter results, especially if local adult
population density no longer mediates recruitment success
of settling larvae (Hastings & Botsford 1999; White &
Kendall 2007). Exploration of the questions presented in
this paper for ﬁshery species exhibiting these and other life
history traits is needed. In all ﬁshery management investi-
gations, it is important to explicitly integrate ﬁsh population
dynamics with ﬁshery economics to accurately characterize
emergent bioeconomic consequences arising from alterna-
tive management strategies. Elucidation of such conse-
quences is critical for a productive dialogue among ﬁshery
regulatory, industry and conservation parties on what
strategy each considers appropriate for successful ﬁshery
management.
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